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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
How does one know one has studied something sufficiently well to remember 
it later? Under what circumstances is one’s confidence in what one has studied a true 
measure of what he or she later will remember? Answers to these questions are 
important to help people learn effectively and are broadly applicable to any 
educational setting (e.g., learning foreign language vocabulary). Effective learning 
and remembering depend on the learner’s metacognitive skills. The current study 
focuses on a specific kind of metacognitive monitoring called judgments of learning 
(JOLs), which refers to an individual’s judgments of the likelihood of recalling 
previously studied items. Research on the topic seeks to understand reasons for the 
accuracy of JOLs in predicting item-by-item memory performance. 
To begin, the distinction between absolute accuracy (or calibration) and 
relative accuracy (or resolution) should be noted. Absolute accuracy refers to the 
accuracy of assigning probabilities to the items in terms of the judged likelihood of 
correct recall (e.g., the correspondence between percent of items recalled and the 
mean of JOLs). Relative accuracy refers to the accuracy of distinguishing between 
one item relative to another (e.g., the extent to which JOLs discriminate between 
recalled and unrecalled items). Some variables influence both kinds of accuracy in the 
same direction. For example, if there is a delay between study trial and judgment trial, 
not only does the absolute accuracy of JOLs more or less improve, but their relative 
accuracy also increases, which is called delayed-JOL effect (Nelson & Dunlosky, 




Repeated presentation of the list1, for example, increases the relative accuracy of 
JOLs and decreases their absolute accuracy; people tend to underestimate their recall 
performance with practice, which is called underconfidence-with-practice (UWP) 
effect (Koriat, Sheffer, & Ma’ayan, 2002). In exploring the issue of JOL accuracy, the 
present research is limited to consideration of the relative accuracy of JOLs2 (see 
Koriat et al., 2002, for concerns of both absolute and relative accuracy). Although 
there is not yet a consensus explanation for delayed-JOL and practice effects, several 
theories of the underlying process of JOLs have been proposed that bear on these 
issues. 
Theories of JOLs and the Relative Accuracy of JOLs  
Three theories of JOLs that account for effects of both delay and practice will 
be described. The first two of the theories, described below, were originally 
developed to account for the delayed-JOL effect, and the third focused more on the 
practice effect. However, all three theories refer to both effects implicitly or 
explicitly. 
The first theory is the monitoring-dual memories hypothesis (Nelson & 
Dunlosky, 1991). According to this theory, when one assesses the likelihood of 
memory performance, the individual monitors the information retrieved from memory 
                                                          
1 Repeated presentation of the list means that a study phase goes through all of the items, and 
then another study phase occurs for each item. This procedure is in contrast to massed 
repetition, in which each item is presented multiple times without any other items or events 
between the repeated presentations in a study phase. 
2 Since Koriat et al. (2002) first brought the UWP effect to the attention of researchers, many 
studies have discussed JOL accuracy in terms of absolute accuracy. To avoid confusion, the 
present research focuses only on relative accuracy and does not discuss absolute accuracy. 
Hereafter, JOL relative accuracy is called JOL accuracy. As seen in Appendixes, however, 
the UWP effect did occur in the present data, and the complete results of the absolute 




about the to-be-judged item. If such information at the time of the JOL is not 
predictive of eventual memory performance, then JOL accuracy will be low. When a 
JOL is made immediately after item presentation, the information retrieved from 
short-term memory (STM) functions as noise for the monitoring of information 
retrieved from long-term memory (LTM), thus reducing JOL accuracy. By contrast, 
when the JOL is delayed until the to-be-judged item has left STM, less interference 
occurs in monitoring item information retrieved from LTM, and therefore JOL 
accuracy increases.  
The monitoring-dual memories hypothesis does not explicitly refer to the 
practice effect. However, it implies that practice can increase JOL accuracy because 
this hypothesis suggests that JOLs are based on the retrieval of target, and that 
practice leads to access of the information about the to-be-judged item which is 
predictive of future recall. 
Second, Spellman and Bjork (1992) offered a different explanation of the 
delayed-JOL effect. They assumed that individuals covertly attempt target retrieval 
when making JOLs and argued that the delayed-JOL effect occurs because retrieved 
items become more retrievable due to the spacing of the retrieval practice whereas 
unretrieved items do not receive such spaced retrieval practice and become less 
retrievable. Accordingly, a high correlation between delayed JOLs and recall occurs 
because of the effect of spaced retrieval practice on subsequent recall, referred to as 
the self-fulfilling-prophecy hypothesis by Nelson, Narens, and Dunlosky (2004) (or 
the memory hypothesis by Kimball & Metcalfe, 2003).  




with practice, presumably due to the increased retrievability of recalled items. This 
hypothesis predicts that the final recall should be greater (1) for items that previously 
had delayed JOLs than for items that previously had immediate JOLs (cf. Kimball & 
Metcalfe, 2003) and (2) for items previously repeated than for items not previously 
repeated. While the latter has been found widely, the former is not the case. The 
direction of the difference in recall performance has varied unsystematically; recall 
was reliably greater after delayed JOLs than after immediate JOLs (e.g., Dunlosky & 
Nelson, 1994; Koriat & Shitzer-Reichert, 2002); recall did not differ after delayed 
versus immediate JOLs (e.g., Jang & Nelson, 2005; Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991); and 
recall was reliably greater after immediate JOLs than after delayed JOLs (e.g., 
Dunlosky & Nelson, 1992; Meeter & Nelson, 2003). 
The third theory is the cue-utilization framework (Koriat, 1997). According to 
this theory, JOLs are based on a variety of cues, which are more or less predictive of 
memory performance, and will be accurate to the degree that the cues are consistent 
with the factors underlying recall. There are two modes of influence on JOLs: (1) the 
theory (rule)-based influence that entails an analytic deduction based on a priori 
theory, and (2) the experience (heuristic)-based influence underlying the reliance on 
mnemonic cues that reflect the degree to which the studied items have been mastered 
(Koriat, 1997; Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, & Bar, 2004). With practice learning the same 
items, the basis for JOLs changes from a theory-based inference towards a greater 
reliance on experience-based mnemonic cues that can serve as valid cues for JOLs 
resulting in increased JOL accuracy. 




on mnemonic cues pertaining to the ease with which the target can be retrieved, and 
that the two effects of delay and practice are mediated by a similar process, the 
function of mnemonic cues. Indeed, Koriat and Shitzer-Reichert (2002) reported 
results obtained with children aged 7 through 10 that were consistent with this idea; 
JOL accuracy did not differ after delay versus with practice.  
Empirical results on the effect of practice on JOL accuracy are not fully 
consistent with theories predicting an increase in accuracy. At the outset, it is 
imperative to clarify how previous experiments manipulated practice. Koriat (1997, 
Experiments 1 & 2), Koriat et al. (2002), and Koriat and Shitzer-Reichert (2002) 
compared a condition that provided practice with study, JOL rating, and test to a 
condition that did not provide any practice (SJTSJT vs. SJT, where S, J, and T 
represent study, JOL rating, and test, respectively), and Lovelace (1984) compared a 
condition that included study and test practice to one that did not (STSJT vs. SJT). 
Both experiments provided study and test practice and found that JOL accuracy 
increased as a result. By contrast, Jang and Nelson (2005), Koriat (1997, Experiment 
3), and Meeter and Nelson (2003) who all found no practice effect, and Dunlosky and 
Nelson (1994) in which JOL accuracy even decreased with practice, investigated 
study-alone practice (SSJT vs. SJT). One possible interpretation of the lack of 
consensus is that test practice is necessary to achieve a practice effect on JOL 
accuracy. This explanation is plausible because King, Zechmeister, and Shaughnessy 
(1980) found that prediction of memory performance was more accurate when 
individuals were given tests prior to the prediction task.  




they did not include the proper control condition, their results could not ascertain 
whether practice without test also increased accuracy but to a lesser degree than 
occurred when test practice was included. Second, King et al. (1980) did not use 
Goodman-Kruskal gamma, a nonparametric correlation coefficient, which is the 
measure of relative accuracy used in almost all articles published since the 1980s. 
This measurement problem also occurs in Lovelace (1984), who reported that practice 
both with and without test increased accuracy. Gamma does not assume interval 
scales on either of the variables being correlated; the Likert-type scales that both King 
et al. (1980) and Lovelace (1984) used should not be assumed to be interval scales. 
Ties should be excluded when the experimental procedure forces ties to occur; ties 
occur whenever a j-place rating scale is used to rate k items, with j < k, for example, j 
= 6 and k = 72 in King et al. (1980), and j = 5 and k = 40 in Lovelace (1984). Gamma 
is unaffected by ties either in the ratings or in the eventual memory performance 
(Gonzalez & Nelson, 1996; Nelson, 1984). 
At least a part of the increase of JOL accuracy that occurs as a result of 
practice may be due to a delayed-JOL effect, because a JOL placed immediately after 
the second study trial is necessarily delayed with respect to the first study trial, and 
therefore it may incorporate information about the first study trial. However, that 
interpretation does not explain why JOL accuracy increased only when items were 
repeated with test, but not without test. 
Retrieval Practice Effect and Retrieval Hypothesis 
Features of study-alone practice and practice with test are fundamentally 




stored in memory, additional test trials tend to enhance performance more than 
additional study trials do. Dempster (1996) concluded that any effects of test are not 
due simply to re-presentation of the recalled item but due to the memory retrieval 
itself, which is called retrieval practice effect (or testing effect; Glover, 1989). 
For example3, Allen, Mahler, and Estes (1969) found that 5 study trials of 
paired associates followed by 5 cued-recall tests of the pairs led to better final 
retention on a cued-recall test one day later than did only 10 presentations. This result 
suggests that the function of practice with test differs from the function of study-alone 
practice because the number of total trials is the same for each condition.  
Carrier and Pashler (1992) compared two methods of learning paired 
associates. In the pure study trial method, both items of a pair were presented 
simultaneously for study. In the test trial/study trial method, people attempted to 
retrieve the response item during a period in which only the stimulus was present (and 
the response item of the pair was presented after some delay). The results revealed 
that there was a reliable advantage on the final cued-recall test of the test trial/study 
trial condition over in the pure study trial condition. The authors concluded that 
retrieving an item from memory when tested has beneficial effects for final retention 
beyond the effects due to just studying the item. 
During multi-trial learning, people are generally accurate in distinguishing 
previously recalled and non-recalled items and can monitor their knowledge of the 
outcomes of previous tests. Consequently, items can be learned efficiently on 
                                                          
3 Although many studies in the memory literature have reported that practice with test 
improves final recall performance more strongly than study-alone practice does, I describe 
here only the results from cued-recall both because cued-recall was used in this research, and 





subsequent study trials (Bisanz, Vesonder, & Voss, 1978; Gardiner & Klee, 1976; 
Klee & Gardiner, 1976; Robinson & Kulp, 1970). Such results suggest that retrieval 
practice can play an important role in metacognitive judgments. Indeed, JOLs are 
more strongly correlated with recall on the previous test than with recall on the 
subsequent test (King et al., 1980; Koriat, 1997; Lovelace, 1984), which suggests that 
JOLs are based on information pertaining to the outcome of the previous recall. Thus, 
JOLs may in part constitute postdiction based on memory for remembered items. 
The retrieval practice effect can be explained by the retrieval hypothesis in 
that the number of retrieval events, not just the amount of processing, influences final 
retention (Bjork, 1988; Dempster, 1996; Glover, 1989). Bjork (1988) suggested that 
an initial retrieval aids a later retrieval to the extent that it constitutes practice for that 
later retrieval. An act of retrieval does not simply strengthen an item’s representation 
in memory, but rather enhances some aspect of the retrieval process per se.  
The retrieval hypothesis also extends to the practice effect on JOL accuracy. 
When cued recall is tested immediately after presentation, probability of correct recall 
is near 1.0 (Tulving & Arbuckle, 1963). However, people are able to judge whether a 
presently studied item has been learned well enough to be recalled on a later test 
because items differ in associative strength immediately following presentation, and 
people can discriminate these differences in item difficulty (Arbuckle & Cuddy, 
1969; Underwood, 1964). Presumably, if items are repeated without test, people have 
little information about item retrievability and instead rely heavily on item difficulty 
when making JOLs, and their accuracy is related to their ability to assess item 




guaranteed but depends on the correlation between item difficulty and recall. By 
contrast, if items are repeated with test, people can discriminate recalled from non-
recalled items through the intervening test. Then, when making JOLs, they may use 
the information about the items’ retrievability, which is highly predictive of eventual 
memory performance and leads to more accurate JOLs. 
Specific Goals of the Present Research 
First, this study involves empirical generalizations of the practice effect on 
JOL accuracy because the cause of the conflicting results summarized above has not 
yet been resolved. The hypothesis under test is that intervening test trials in practice 
are critical for enhancing JOL accuracy. This would be true if the intervening tests 
improve individuals’ abilities to discriminate items that can be recalled from items 
that cannot, and therefore allow more effective assessments of future performance. 
This research also investigated whether overt responses through test trials but not 
covert ones are necessary to increase JOL accuracy. Although memory performance 
improves with practice only when an overt response is involved (Cohen & Johansson, 
1967; King et al., 1980), the differentiation between overt retrieval responses and 
covert retrieval attempts on JOL accuracy is not known. 
Second, this research involves theoretical interpretation of the practice effect. 
All three theories (monitoring-dual memories hypothesis, Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991; 
self-fulfilling-prophecy hypothesis, Spellman & Bjork, 1992; and cue-utilization 
framework, Koriat, 1997) agree that practice may increase JOL accuracy by providing 
valid information retrieved from memory about the to-be-judged item. However, none 




already been discussed in memory research and potentially is critical in metacognition 
research. Unless the theories differentiate the role of test practice from the role of 
study practice, the practice effect may be overlooked. 
Finally, the present research tested the hypothesis from the cue-utilization 
framework that the effects of delay and practice are mediated by a similar process, the 
function of mnemonic cues pertaining to the fluency with which the target can be 
retrieved (Koriat, 1997). Little research has tested whether this is so. The single 
exception is the result obtained with children that the correlation between recall and 
JOLs did not differ after delay versus with practice (Koriat & Shitzer-Reichert, 2002). 
However, the increase of JOL accuracy after delay and with practice may not derive 
from the same source for at least two reasons. First, JOL distributions are different 
between JOLs after delay and with practice. Delayed JOLs are typically associated 
with a polarized distribution of JOLs ratings (Dunlosky & Nelson, 1994) such that 
people tend to use extremely low and high values of the scale more frequently than 
middle values. For immediate JOLs, by contrast, people tend to use middle values 
more often than extreme values. Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) also noted that in 
confidence judgments, polarized distributions tend to be associated with better 
accuracy. With practice, however, the increase in usage of extreme JOL values is 
found mainly at the higher values of JOLs, but not at the lower values of JOLs 
(Dunlosky & Nelson, 1994, Koriat et al., 2002). Second, the type of items that 
contributes to the increase of JOL accuracy may be different between JOLs after 
delay and with practice. In the multi-trial learning situation, prediction of memory 




preceding trial (Bisanz et al., 1978; Robinson & Kulp, 1970). Thus, items recalled 
correctly on trial n-1 would be expected to receive “Yes” predictions on trial n, and 
indeed such predictions, with few exceptions, should likely be accurate because items 
recalled correctly on trial n-1 should tend to be recalled correctly again on trial n 
(Vesonder & Voss, 1985). If JOLs are based on such knowledge of items recalled 
correctly from the previous test trial, it is expected that the increase of JOL accuracy 
after delay and with practice may derive from different sources for each other because 
a pair of items in which one is recalled and the other is not at the time of JOLs mainly 





Chapter 2: Experiment 1 
 
Experiment 1 manipulated JOL timing (immediate vs. delayed) and type of 
practice. The type of practice had 5 conditions. Four of them were as follows: no 
practice (SJT, the control condition); study-alone practice (SSJT: Dunlosky & 
Nelson, 1994; Jang & Nelson, 2005; Koriat, 1997, Experiment 3; Lovelace, 1984; 
Meeter & Nelson, 2003); practice with study and test (STSJT: Lovelace, 1984); and 
practice with study, JOL rating and test (SJTSJT: Koriat, 1997, Experiments 1 & 2; 
Koriat et al., 2002; Koriat & Shitzer-Reichert, 2002). These conditions were used in 
the previous studies separately and in part, but no comprehensive research has 
manipulated them all and compared immediate with delayed JOLs in one study. The 
fifth type of practice, which included study and JOL rating (SJSJT), tested whether 
JOL rating repetition (i.e., covert retrieval attempt) influences JOL accuracy. 
Method 
Participants. Two hundred and twenty-five undergraduate students at the 
University of Maryland were recruited and received credit for psychology courses in 
return for their participation. Forty-five participants were assigned to each of the 5 
groups by block randomization. Participants in all experiments were treated in accord 
with the “Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct” (American 
Psychological Association, 1992).  
Materials. Stimuli consisted of 60 concrete (Concreteness ≥ 6.10; norms from 
Paivio, Yuille, & Madigan, 1968), unrelated noun-noun pairs, consistent with most of 




excluded from recall so as to prevent recency effects. The remaining 48 pairs 
comprised two blocks of 24 pairs per block and were the only ones that were 
analyzed. 
Design. The experiment design was a 5 × 2 mixed factorial with type of 
practice (SJT, SSJT, SJSJT, STSJT, vs. SJTSJT) manipulated between subjects and 
JOL timing (immediate vs. delayed) manipulated within subjects.  
SJT was the control condition, having one study and JOL rating phase 
followed by one test phase, SSJT differed from SJT by having a repeated study-alone 
phase, SJSJT differed from the control condition by having added study and JOL 
rating phases, STSJT had additional study and test phases, and SJTSJT had additional 
study, JOL rating, and test phases. 
Procedure. All participants were instructed to study pairs and to indicate their 
JOL for each pair when the first word in the pair appeared alone as the cue for the 
JOL. Pairs destined for immediate and delayed JOLs underwent the same study 
procedure, but differed at JOL timing. During the study phase, each pair was 
presented in the center of the screen for 5 sec. Pairs were randomly assigned to the 
immediate- or the delayed-JOL condition, which was self-paced in both cases. Each 
immediate JOL occurred immediately after the offset of each pair (i.e., right after a 
pair was presented for 5 sec). It was prompted with the cue word and the question 
“How confident are you that in about ten minutes from now you will be able to recall 
the second word of the item when prompted with the first?” The participants reported 
their estimate on a scale of “0 = definitely will not recall, 20 = 20% sure, 40 = 40% 




occurred after the final immediate JOL or study trial of a given block. All pairs were 
randomized anew for each study phase of all conditions and for each participant. 
During the test phase, in which recall was also self-paced, the participants 
were instructed to type the target word when cued by the first word of the pair. If they 
had no guess, then they typed NEXT so as to proceed to the next test trial. All pairs 
were randomized anew for each test phase of all conditions and for each participant. 
Results 
For each experiment, I first briefly report the recall and JOL magnitude results 
for each condition. I then look at relative accuracy assessed with Goodman-Kruskal 
gamma, followed by the proportion of items receiving each JOL rating. Throughout, 
all tests of statistically significant differences use α = .05, and estimates of effect size 
(ES) are reported as partial eta squared for significant effects. 
The descriptive statistics and the results from separate two-way ANOVAs on 
percent correct recall and on JOL magnitude are reported in Appendix A. Using 
Tukey’s honestly significant difference (HSD) test to compare the pooled immediate 
and delayed JOLs across the five practice conditions, the significance pattern of recall 
can be represented as ‘SJT’< ‘SSJT’ ≈ ‘SJSJT’< ‘STSJT’ ≈ ‘SJTSJT’ where ≈ 
indicates non-significant difference and < indicates a significant directional difference 
(the results for each level of JOL timing are summarized in Table A1). These results 
provide evidence of the successful manipulation of type of practice and a replication 
of Cohen and Johansson (1967) and King et al. (1980) that memory performance 
improves with item repetitions only when an overt response is involved. The 




220) < 1, which is inconsistent with the results of previous studies, in which practice 
was a within-subject variable (e.g., Dunlosky & Nelson, 1994; Jang & Nelson, 2005; 
Koriat, 1997). 
JOL accuracy in all conditions. Figure 1 shows the mean gamma as a function 
of JOL timing and type of practice. A two-way ANOVA showed that both main 
effects were significant, F(4, 202) = 3.55, MSE = .06, ES = .07; F(1, 202) = 226.92, 
MSE = .05, ES = .53, for type of practice and JOL timing, respectively, and that the 
interaction was significant, F(4, 202) = 7.02, MSE = .05, ES = .12. All gammas for 
delayed JOLs were close to ceiling, and as a consequence, the 5 practice conditions 
did not differ, F(4, 202) < 1. Applying Tukey’s HSD test to immediate JOLs, the 
significance pattern can be represented as ‘SJT’ ≈ ‘SSJT’ ≈ ‘SJSJT’ < ‘STSJT’ ≈ 
‘SJTSJT’. These results confirm the hypothesis that practice with test increases JOL 
accuracy and suggest that retrieval practice improves the ability to discriminate items 
that can be recalled from items that cannot.  
Further analyses to compare the delayed-JOL effect and the effect of practice 
with test showed that gamma was greater in SJT with delayed JOLs than in STSJT or 
in SJTSJT with immediate JOLs, t(80) = 5.98; t(78) = 5.76, respectively. The 
delayed-JOL effect was found even in STSJT, which had the smallest gamma 
difference between immediate and delayed JOLs, t(40) = 5.42. These results 
disconfirm the hypothesis from the cue-utilization framework that the effects of delay 
and practice are mediated by a similar process. 
JOL accuracy in SJTSJT. The practice condition, SJTSJT itself, as used by 




Reichert, 2002), treats practice as a within-subject variable (i.e., control [first SJT] vs. 
practice [second SJT]). Hence, further analyses of gammas on this condition are 
critical to refer to the practice effect and are reported below; all results of recall and 
JOL magnitude are reported in Appendix B.  
Four gamma correlations were calculated from SJTSJT for each of immediate 
JOLs and delayed JOLs (i.e., a total of 8 gamma correlations): (1) gamma between 
the first JOL rating and the first recall (i.e., SJTSJT where underlines identify the JOL 
rating and recall used to calculate gamma), (2) gamma between the second JOL rating 
and the second recall (i.e., SJTSJT), (3) gamma between the second JOL rating and 
the first recall (i.e., SJTSJT), and (4) gamma between the first JOL rating and the 
second recall (i.e., SJTSJT). Figure 2 shows the mean gamma as a function of the 
variables being correlated and JOL timing. A two-way ANOVA showed that the main 
effects of the variables being correlated and JOL timing were significant, F(3, 99) = 
40.29, MSE = .07, ES = .55; F(1, 33) = 75.90, MSE = .06, ES = .75, respectively, and 
that the interaction was significant, F(3, 99) = 15.98, MSE = .08, ES = .34. By 
Tukey’s HSD test for immediate JOLs, the significance pattern can be represented as 
‘SJTSJT’ ≈ ‘SJTSJT’ < ‘SJTSJT’ < ‘SJTSJT’ (the corresponding outcome for 
delayed JOLs is presented in Figure 2). These results replicated most of the findings 
that Koriat (1997) showed using immediate JOLs, and suggest that (immediate) JOLs 
are based on information pertaining to the outcome of the previous recall (i.e., the 
highest gamma is for SJTSJT) and are at least partially postdiction based on memory 
for remembered items (King et al., 1980; Koriat, 1997; Lovelace, 1984). Indeed, 




a delayed-JOL effect in this condition, t(33) = 1.38, p = .18.  
Gamma was greater for SJTSJT with delayed JOLs than for SJTSJT with 
immediate JOLs, t(33) = 3.51, and the delayed-JOL effect occurred in SJTSJT, t(33) 
= 3.36. In fact, gamma was even greater for SJTSJT with delayed JOLs than for 
SJTSJT with immediate JOLs, t(33) = 2.27.  
All results from analyses on SJTSJT provide further evidence that practice 
with test increases immediate JOL accuracy (i.e., ‘SJTSJT’ < ‘SJTSJT’), and that 
practice with test did not improve accuracy as much as delay did, as explored above 
where this condition was manipulated between subjects. 
Linking JOL distributions to JOL accuracy. In another attempt to understand 
the practice effect on JOL accuracy, I report how people used the rating scale when 
making JOLs.4 Figures 3 and 4 show the distributions of JOL ratings for items 
correctly and incorrectly recalled, respectively, at the final test. For the control and 
practice without test, participants used extreme values far more frequently than 
middle values in the delayed-JOL condition whereas the reverse was true in the 
immediate-JOL condition; most delayed-JOL items receiving extremely high and low 
values were recalled correctly and incorrectly at the final test, respectively. 
Participants also used somewhat more extreme values when items were 
repeated with test than without test (except for STSJT for incorrectly recalled items), 
and most items in the practice-with-test conditions receiving high and low values 
were recalled correctly and incorrectly at the final test, respectively. In particular, the 
                                                          
4 To confirm whether distributions of JOL ratings differ from one another, the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test was applied. However, the inferential statistics from the test are not reported 
here because they are not closely relevant to the hypotheses under investigation. The 
complete results of the distribution data analyses across all experiments are available-upon-




difference between the practice-with-test and the practice-without-test distributions 
(of immediate JOLs) occurs more clearly for correctly recalled items at the final test 
than for incorrectly recalled items. However, the distributions of delayed JOLs are 
clearly different from those of practice with test in the immediate-JOL condition; the 
delayed JOLs were more polarized than the immediate JOLs with test trials. An 
implication of the different distributions is that the greater accuracy of delayed JOLs 
results from an obvious bidirectional shift (i.e., extremely high and low JOL ratings), 
and that the moderately great accuracy of practice with test relative to study-alone 
practice arises from a unidirectional one (i.e., more high values of JOL ratings).  
Summary and Discussion 
Experiment 1 supports the hypothesis that intervening tests (manipulated as 
both a between- and a within-subject variable) are critical to improve one’s ability to 
discriminate items that can be recalled from items that cannot, when JOLs are made 
immediately following item presentation. However, the two important factors 
affecting JOL accuracy, practice with test and delay, involve different processes, as 
indicated by greater accuracy and the very different rating distributions, more 
polarized after delay than following test practice. 
Presumably, the increased accuracy from practice with test relies largely on 
the knowledge of the outcomes of previous tests, which is somewhat but not fully 
diagnostic of subsequent recall. Practice without test provides no opportunities for 
such diagnosticity. Of importance, the practice-with-test effect is achieved through 
overt but not covert responses, which suggests that self-feedback gained through 




aware of the knowledge that makes JOLs accurate. This idea is consistent with the 
finding that JOL accuracy increased in both feedback and no feedback conditions 
with repeated items having test trials (Koriat, 1997). 
In regard to the evaluation of JOL accuracy, Experiment 1 did not make any 
assumption that a given item was or was not retrievable when it received a JOL. 
However, both monitoring-dual memories and self-fulfilling-prophecy hypotheses 
assume hypothetical aspects of retrieval occur at the time of JOLs. Experiment 2 
more specifically investigates the contribution of intervening tests to the increase of 
JOL accuracy, not only offering the possibility of making the hypothetical aspects of 
retrieval observable, but also yielding more information about the memory 





Chapter 3: Experiment 2 
 
Experiment 2 employed a revised methodology for metacognitive research, 
which is called “Pre-judgment Recall And Monitoring (PRAM)”, provided by Nelson 
et al. (2004). In the PRAM methodology, a stage of recall, termed pre-judgment 
recall, is inserted right before JOL rating. The PRAM methodology allows items to be 
categorized in terms of whether or not they are recalled in the pre-judgment recall 
phase. Gamma, then, is computed separately for three partitions of item dyads: (1) 
dyads in which both of the items were recalled during pre-judgment recall (RR 
dyads), (2) dyads in which one was recalled and the other was not during pre-
judgment recall (RN dyads), and (3) dyads in which neither of the items was recalled 
during pre-judgment recall (NN dyads). One can compute separate gamma statistics, 
RRγ , RNγ , and NNγ , for the three item dyad partitions. The overall gamma ( ..γ ) is 











γ ,   (1) 
where fij is the frequency of occurrence of dyads in partition ij (e.g.,  is the 
frequency of RR dyads). Simplifying, Equation 1 can be expressed as 
RRf
)()()(.. NNNNRNRNRRRR ppp γγγγ ×+×+×= ,   (2) 
where each p is the proportion of all dyads in the partition (or the weight for each 
component gamma: e.g., )( NNRNRRRRRR ffffp ++= , where 
). 1=++ NNRNRR ppp




reported that people who predict their future recall discriminate between items more 
accurately when discriminating between a recalled and a non-recalled item than when 
discriminating between two recalled items. They also found that for delayed JOLs, 
most of the relevant discriminations are between RN dyads and relatively few are 
between RR dyads; whereas for immediate JOLs, most of the relevant discriminations 
are between RR dyads and relatively few are between RN dyads. These results 
ascribe most of the greater accuracy of delayed JOLs to different ratios of easier 
versus more difficult discriminations between items. 
Experiment 1 discovered that practice with test, but neither practice with JOL 
rating nor study-alone practice, improved JOL accuracy, and that the advantage of 
practice with test was different from the advantage of delay. Experiment 2 used the 
PRAM methodology to investigate the effects of practice more analytically. 
Specifically, this experiment asks two questions; how practice with versus without 
test affects accuracy for immediate JOLs within RR, NN, and RN dyads; and whether 
the advantage of practice with test is most pronounced in RN dyads, mirroring the 
typical delayed-JOL effect (without practice) – that would be true if the influences of 
delay and practice derive from the same source.  
Method 
Participants. Two hundred and seventy-nine undergraduate students at the 
University of Maryland were recruited and received credit for psychology courses in 
return for their participation. Ninety-three participants were assigned to each of the 3 
groups by block randomization. 




of Experiment 1 except that a stage of pre-judgment recall was inserted right before 
the JOL rating through all conditions. The pre-judgment recall consisted of self-paced 
paired associate recall as in the final recall test. 
Design. The design was a between-subject design comprised of three 
conditions: SJT with delayed JOLs, SSJT with immediate JOLs, and STSJT with 
immediate JOLs (i.e., the control with delayed JOLs vs. two practice conditions with 
immediate JOLs). 
Results 
The descriptive statistics and the results from separate one-way ANOVAs on 
percent correct recall and on JOL magnitude are reported in Appendix C. By Tukey’s 
HSD test, the significance pattern of recall can be represented as ‘SJT with delayed 
JOLs’ < ‘SSJT with immediate JOLs’ < ‘STSJT with immediate JOLs’. The 
prerequisite recall results allow for analyses of gamma, as described next. 
JOL accuracy. The mean overall gammas were .95 (SE = .02), .55 (SE = .03), 
and .68 (SE = .02) for SJT with delayed JOLs, SSJT with immediate JOLs, and 
STSJT with immediate JOLs, respectively. A one-way ANOVA showed that the main 
effect of type of practice was significant, F(2, 266) = 64.43, MSE = .06, ES = .33. By 
Tukey’s HSD test, the significance pattern can be represented as ‘SSJT with 
immediate JOLs’ < ‘STSJT with immediate JOLs’ < ‘SJT with delayed JOLs’. These 
results are consistent with those of Experiment 1; in the immediate-JOL conditions, 
practice with test yielded better JOL accuracy than did study-alone practice but did 
not improve accuracy as much as delay did.  




and RNγ ), and the mean weights of RR and RN dyads (  and ), respectively, 
from the PRAM methodology. I do not include the 
RRp RNp
NNγ  and  results because 
that NN dyads occurred so infrequently (i.e., only 7, 2, and 2 of each of the 93 
participants had estimates of 
NNp
NNγ  for SJT with delayed JOLs, SSJT with immediate 
JOLs, and STSJT with immediate JOLs, respectively), and any difference played a 
negligible role in overall JOL accuracy (but each mean of NNγ  and  is reported 
below where the overall gamma is calculated with the three component gammas and 
their weights). I conducted one-way ANOVAs for each component gamma and for 
each weight. First, 
NNp
RRγ  was significantly different among the three conditions, F(2, 
229) = 4.57, MSE = .18, ES = .04. By Tukey’s HSD test, the significance pattern of 
RRγ  can be represented as ‘SJT with delayed JOLs’ ≈ ‘SSJT with immediate JOLs’ < 
‘STSJT with immediate JOLs’. While Nelson et al. (2004) found greater RRγ  for 
delayed JOLs than for immediate JOLs, the pattern of results was opposite if practice 
with test but not without test was added. Second, RNγ  was significantly different 
among the three conditions, F(2, 149) = 11.61, MSE = .09, ES = .14. By Tukey’s 
HSD test, the significance pattern of RNγ  can be represented as ‘SSJT with 
immediate JOLs’ < ‘STSJT with immediate JOLs’ ≈ ‘SJT with delayed JOLs’. The 
finding that RNγ  was greater for delayed JOLs than for immediate JOLs (Nelson et 
al., 2004) was replicated when items were repeated without test but not with test. 
Both  and  were significantly different among the three conditions, 
F(2, 266) = 4185.66, MSE = .01, ES = .97; F(2, 266) = 4018.95, MSE = .01, ES = .97, 





represented as ‘SJT with delayed JOLs’ < ‘STSJT with immediate JOLs’ ≈ ‘SSJT 
with immediate JOLs’, for ; and as ‘SSJT with immediate JOLs’ ≈ ‘STSJT with 
immediate JOLs’ < ‘SJT with delayed JOLs’ for . These results are consistent 
with those of Nelson et al. (2004) (in which practice was not manipulated) that  
was greater for immediate JOLs than for delayed JOLs whereas  was greater for 
delayed JOLs than for immediate JOLs. The differences of the weights between 
STSJT with immediate JOLs and SJT with delayed JOLs are difficult to reconcile 






Linking JOL distributions to JOL accuracy. Figures 7 and 8 show the 
distributions of JOL ratings for items that were and were not recalled, respectively, at 
both the pre-judgment and final recall tests. As in Experiment 1, most delayed-JOL 
items receiving extremely high and low values were recalled correctly and incorrectly 
at the final test, respectively, and most items in STSJT receiving high values, relative 
to those in SSJT, were recalled correctly at the final test. However, the distributions 
of SJT with delayed JOLs are different from those of STSJT with immediate JOLs for 
both correct and incorrect responses. 
Most importantly, the data of pre-judgment recall were almost exactly 
identical to those of final recall in SJT with delayed JOLs for both correct and 
incorrect responses. By contrast, for items in the two immediate-JOL conditions, the 
distributions between pre-judgment and final recall tests were different from each 
other for both correct and incorrect responses. An interpretation of the rating 




time of the delayed JOL is strongly predictive of eventual memory performance, and 
then delayed JOLs are highly accurate. 
Summary and Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated the findings of the effect of practice with test in 
Experiment 1. By Equation 2, the overall gamma for each condition is calculated with 
negligible differences of decimal points as follows: 
.95 ≈ (.03 × .48) + (.96 × .97) + (.001 × (-.40)) = .94, 
.55 ≈ (.97 × .54) + (.02 × .66) + (.0001 × 1.00) = .54, 
.68 = (.95 × .68) + (.04 × .86) + (.0002 × 1.00) = .68, 
where the far left-hand side of each dual equation is the overall gamma for the 
conditions, SJT with delayed JOLs, SSJT with immediate JOLs, and STSJT with 
immediate JOLs, respectively, and the far right-hand side is the calculated gamma 
with the three component gammas and their weights. The practice effect with versus 
without test mainly results from two component gammas (i.e., higher RRγ  and RNγ  
for practice with test); intervening tests generally boost up ability to discriminate 
items that can be recalled from items that cannot at the final test. Most obviously, the 
overall accuracy of delayed JOLs is greater than that of practice-with-test immediate 
JOLs whereas a particular component gamma, RRγ , shows the opposite pattern. It is 
no less dubious to connect that the advantage of practice with test on overall JOL 
accuracy does not mirror the typical delayed-JOL effect because the practice-with-test 
effect depends largely on RR dyads (i.e., extremely high  and greater RRp RRγ ) 
whereas the delayed-JOL effect does largely on RN dyads (i.e., extremely high ).  RNp




rating distributions at the pre-judgment and final recall tests show markedly the 
difference between the delayed-JOL effect (i.e., identical distributions between the 
two tests) and the effect of practice with test (i.e., more frequent lower values for 
items correctly and incorrectly recalled at the pre-judgment recall test). When they 
learn items repeatedly with intervening tests, in all possibility, individuals rely so 
much on the outcomes of the previous test that they may somewhat but not fully 
predict the memory performance of future test. 
Experiment 3 further investigates whether the main function of test is to raise 
JOL accuracy and rules out an alternative explanation of the beneficial effect of 





Chapter 4: Experiment 3 
 
Experiments 1 and 2 revealed the advantage of practice with test (STSJT) over 
study-alone practice (SSJT) on immediate-JOL accuracy. However, because one more 
phase (T) was inserted in STSJT than in SSJT, it is plausible that the increased 
processing for the additional phase caused the increase of JOL accuracy (in fact, 
recall was greater in STSJT than in SSJT). Although the explanation is inconsistent 
with the fact that there was no advantage of study-alone practice (SSJT) over no 
repetition (SJT) in Experiment 1, the explanation deserves attention. Manipulating the 
type of practice, SSSJT and STSJT, in which both conditions included 5 processing 
steps, Experiment 3 tested whether the beneficial effect of STSJT was due to the 
function of the test or just to the increased processing. 
Experiment 3, just as did Experiments 1 and 2, also compared the two effects 
of delay and practice. 
Method 
Participants. One hundred and six undergraduate students at the University of 
Maryland were recruited and received credit for psychology courses in return for their 
participation. Fifty-three participants were assigned to each of the 2 groups by block 
randomization. 
Materials and procedure. The materials were identical to those of Experiment 
1. STSJT was the same condition as in Experiment 1, and SSSJT had three 
consecutive study phases and JOL rating (during the third one) followed by test 





Design. The design of Experiment 3 was a 2 × 2 mixed factorial with type of 
practice (SSSJT vs. STSJT) manipulated between subjects and JOL timing 
(immediate vs. delayed) manipulated within subjects.  
Results 
All results for both recall and JOL magnitude are reported in Appendix D. As 
seen in Table D2, Experiment 3 failed to yield a retrieval practice effect on memory 
performance, presumably due to relatively short test-spacing and/or due to the type of 
task, cued-recall; tests are typically most effective if items are first tested some time 
soon, but not immediately after the presentation and if free-recall is required instead 
of cued-recall or recognition (see Dempster, 1996 for a review; Glover, 1989). 
JOL accuracy. Figure 9 shows the mean gamma as a function of JOL timing 
and type of practice. A two-way ANOVA showed that gamma was greater for 
delayed JOLs than for immediate JOLs, F(1, 92) = 67.71, MSE = .09, ES = .42; that 
there was no main effect of type of practice, F(1, 92) = 3.93, MSE = .10, p = .0504; 
and that the interaction was significant, F(1, 92) = 4.91, MSE = .09, ES = .05. Follow 
up simple-effect tests showed that gamma of immediate JOLs was reliably greater for 
STSJT than for SSSJT, t(92) = 2.37, and that gamma of STSJT was reliably greater 
for delayed JOLs than for immediate JOLs, t(45) = 4.17. These results confirm the 
hypothesis that the increase of JOL accuracy is due to the intervening test itself, and 
disconfirm the hypothesis from the cue-utilization framework, as in Experiments 1 
and 2, that the effects of delay and practice are mediated by a similar process. 




distributions of JOL ratings for items that were correctly and incorrectly recalled, 
respectively, at the final test. For both SSSJT and STSJT, participants used extreme 
JOL ratings more frequently in the delayed-JOL conditions than in the immediate-
JOL conditions.  
Although for both immediate and delayed JOLs in STSJT, participants used 
more high values of JOL ratings for items they correctly recalled at the final test and 
more low ones for items they failed to correctly recall, the immediate JOLs in STSJT 
were not as extreme as were the delayed JOLs. An implication of these rating 
distribution data is that at the time of JOLs, strongly successful differentiation 
between subsequent correct and incorrect recall yields better accuracy, and that it is 
more successful for delayed JOLs than for immediate JOLs with test trials.  
Summary and Discussion 
The results of Experiment 3 provide further support for the hypotheses that 
intervening tests, but not just increased processes, are crucial to enhance JOL 
accuracy, and that the contribution of intervening tests to the increase of JOL 
accuracy differs from that of delay. Experiment 3 shows that greater recall through 
test experience is not needed for accurate JOLs (a conclusion also supported by the 
findings that there was no recall difference between immediate and delayed JOLs 
across all three experiments). An additional study substituted for test does not serve 
as a critical factor to improve JOL accuracy; the gamma results of SSSJT in 





Chapter 5: General Discussion 
 
The results of this research support the hypothesis that retrieving items only 
through test or overt retrieval improves the accuracy of individuals’ predictions 
regarding their memory performance. Neither additional study trials nor additional 
JOL ratings affected the fundamental attribute of judging which items were more 
versus less well-learned. However, the advantage of practice with test was different 
from the advantage caused by delay. Not only did delay improve accuracy more than 
practice with test did, but the improvement was due to effects in different dyads of 
items (i.e., RN and RR dyads for delay and practice with test, respectively). 
Moreover, the distribution of JOL ratings was more polarized for delayed JOLs than 
for practice with test, which reflects better accuracy. Thus, individuals’ item-by-item 
JOLs can be accurately predictive of the effects of intervening tests, but such 
accuracy also depends on the timing of JOLs. 
Different Influences on Delay and Practice with vs. without Test 
The JOL theories mentioned earlier, monitoring-dual memories hypothesis, 
self-fulfilling-prophecy hypothesis, and cue-utilization framework, cannot fully 
account for the beneficial effect of practice with test because they are not concerned 
with the distinction between the effects of study and test experience. In the memory 
literature, however, such a distinction has been discussed (e.g., Bjork & Bjork, 1992; 
see also Dempster, 1996 for a review). Bjork and Bjork (1992) distinguished between 
two hypothetical factors, storage strength (or study practice) and retrieval strength (or 




re-studying an item contributes to storage strength, or the extent to which the item is 
well learned whereas test experience helps build retrieval strength, or the ease with 
which the item can be accessed. Although Bjork and Bjork (1992) did not investigate 
this distinction directly, it can be applied to the present experiments, with an 
assumption from the JOL theories that the valid information retrieved from memory 
about the to-be-judged item yields the increase of JOL accuracy. In similar vein, 
Koriat and Ma’ayan (2005) distinguished encoding fluency, which refers to the ease 
with which items are learned well during study, and retrieval fluency, which refers to 
the ease with which they come to mind (see also, Benjamin, Bjork, & Schwartz, 
1998). Inferring encoding fluency from self-paced study time and retrieval fluency 
from the success and latency of pre-judgment recall, they found that (1) JOLs 
decreased with increasing self-paced study time whereas JOLs increased with 
experimentally manipulated study time, and (2) JOLs increased with retrieval fluency. 
Although Koriat and Ma’ayan’s (2005) distinction appears not to clarify the different 
influences of study-alone practice and practice with test on JOL accuracy because 
study-alone practice is assumed to be relevant for both encoding and retrieval fluency, 
such a distinction certainly merits consideration. 
How do practice with test and delay improve JOL accuracy? Do they affect 
accuracy in the same way? The answers to these questions are important to 
understand the underlying process of JOLs. While Koriat and Shitzer-Reichert (2002) 
found evidence confirming the hypothesis of the same source (i.e., the increased 
fluency of the experience-based mnemonic cues underlying JOLs) between delay and 




children vs. college students) might give rise to these different results. As may be 
ascertained from the findings of the PRAM methodology and distributions of JOL 
ratings, however, the effects of delay and practice with test differ from each other. 
Indeed, all findings of this research suggest that the influence of practice with test is 
intermediate between the effects of immediate JOLs (without test trials) and delayed 
JOLs. The results of the present study are also in accord with a formulation that 
ascribes the difference of accuracy between delay and practice with test to different 
ratios of easier versus more difficult discriminations between items (Nelson et al., 
2004). To speak in the context of the cue-utilization framework, the effects of delay 
and practice with test may differ from each other in terms of the degree that the basis 
for JOLs changes from a theory-based inference towards a greater reliance on 
experience-based mnemonic cues (i.e., a much greater reliance on experience-based 
mnemonic cues after delay than with test practice). From the findings of the PRAM 
methodology, the type of retrieval attempts itself may not be a critical factor unless 
the time duration is controlled because overt retrieval attempts were made in all 
conditions. Another important factor from the results of SJSJT, because covert 
retrieval did not increase JOL accuracy immediately after study trial, is whether the 
study trial and the covert retrieval attempt are spaced far enough apart. At the very 
least, the question of how different the effects of delay and practice with test are (i.e., 
quantitatively or qualitatively) remains open.  
The Nature of the Benefit of Practice with Test 
Although the results of the current study indicate a benefit of practice with 




Bjork, 1988) suggests that it is the processing engendered by acts of retrieval that 
accounts for the effects of intervening tests, not merely the amount of processing. 
This retrieval hypothesis is appealing because tests generally afford fewer retrieval 
cues than additional study trials (e.g., only the stimulus of a pair in cued-recall rather 
than both the stimulus and target of a pair in paired-associate learning). It is also 
relevant to the reason that there is an extremely robust delayed-JOL effect when the 
cue for JOLs is the stimulus alone whereas there is little delayed-JOL effect when the 
cue for JOLs is the stimulus-target pair (Dunlosky & Nelson, 1992). 
The specifics of the retrieval hypothesis exist in a variety of forms. At a global 
level, first, retrieval attempts during intervening tests may help build a context similar 
to that of the final test at the time of JOLs. However, the notion of global context 
similarity does not seem to have much merit because similarity between the cue for 
JOLs and the cue for test is not the primary determinant of the accuracy (Dunlosky & 
Nelson, 1997). Second, intervening tests provide opportunities for general practice 
that boost the likelihood of correct retrieval at the final recall (e.g., Runquist, 1983) 
and then increase overall accuracy. This account is difficult to reconcile with the facts 
that the beneficial effect of prior test on memory performance applies mainly to items 
that were successfully retrieved on that test (Carrier & Pashler, 1992; Glover, 1989), 
and that the proportion of items in RR dyads was large when items were repeated 
with test.  
At the level of individual items, retrieval attempts may either strengthen 
existing retrieval routes to the representation of the item in memory (Birnbaum & 




even a context change for retrieved items. It is assumed that these strengthened or 
new routes/contexts will raise both the accessibility to valid information of the item to 
be judged at the time of JOLs and the probability of correct recall at the final recall. 
Although such hypotheses seem reasonable, there is little evidence that multiple 
retrieval routes/contexts are sufficient to increase memory performance and JOL 
accuracy, and the results of this research cannot entirely support any of the 
hypotheses. These possible explanations are open to question. 
Concluding Comments 
This study has clear implications for applied learning situations. When 
individuals have the option of monitoring their memories either immediately after 
study or after a brief delay and there is only one learning opportunity (e.g., learning 
new concepts in the classroom without any preview until the time of review), they 
should wait for a short delay before making their JOLs. Such delayed JOLs will yield 
a more informed choice of study activities that will be more effective for learning 
those items. When reviewing items (e.g., re-studying the concepts for exams), 
learners should take self-tests because they yield a better long-term retention than 
study-alone practice trials, as previous studies in memory research have found. For 
that reason, including test trials has been often referred to as an optimal method of 
learning (Carrier & Pashler, 1992). The results of the current study support this idea 
suggesting that intervening tests are also important in monitoring one’s knowledge, 
which affects metacognitive control. At the time of review with test trials, monitoring 
memories after a delay is also critical because the combination of intervening tests 




acquisition based on valid information regarding retrievability and for enhancing the 
most long-term retention of the materials.  
The potential of practice with test for improving learning and retention is vast. 
As an example, the present study disclosed different effects on JOL accuracy of 
practice with versus without test. The results suggest that current JOL theories need to 
be modified to reflect that retrieval practice through test provides the relative validity 
individuals rely on to predict their memory performance. It is important to achieve 
valid information about memory for effective learning. The results also suggest that 
there needs to be differentiation between the validity monitored from studied items 
after some delay without test experience and the validity acquired from the previous 
outcomes based on test experience. One way to understand the underlying process of 






Figure 1. Mean gamma as a function of JOL timing and type of practice in 
Experiment 1.  
Each vertical hash mark depicts the standard error of the mean. Means of the type of 
practice that do not share alphabetic subscripts differ in Tukey’s honestly significant 
difference (HSD) comparisons for immediate JOLs. S = Study; J = JOL rating; T = 
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Figure 2. Mean gamma as a function of the variables being correlated and JOL timing 
in SJTSJT of Experiment 1.  
Underlines of SJTSJT identify the measures of JOL magnitude and recall used to 
calculate gamma. Each vertical hash mark depicts the standard error of the mean. 
Means that do not share alphabetic and numeric subscripts differ in Tukey’s HSD 
comparisons for immediate and delayed JOLs, respectively. S = Study; J = JOL 
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Figure 3. Distributions of JOL ratings for items correctly recalled at the final test in 
Experiment 1.  













































































Figure 4. Distributions of JOL ratings for items incorrectly recalled at the final test in 
Experiment 1.  



































































Figure 5. Mean RRγ  and RNγ  as a function of type of practice in Experiment 2.  
Each vertical hash mark depicts the standard error of the mean. Means of the type of 
practice that do not share alphabetic and numeric subscripts differ in Tukey’s HSD 
comparisons for RRγ  and RNγ , respectively. S = Study; J = JOL rating; T = Test; 
































Figure 6. Mean  and  as a function of type of practice in Experiment 2.  RRp RNp
Each vertical hash mark depicts the standard error of the mean. S = Study; J = JOL 

































Figure 7. Distributions of JOL ratings for items correctly recalled at both pre-
judgment and final recall tests in Experiment 2.  
































































Figure 8. Distributions of JOL ratings for items incorrectly recalled at both pre-
judgment and final recall tests in Experiment 2.  
































































Figure 9. Mean gamma as a function of JOL timing and type of practice in 
Experiment 3.  
Each vertical hash mark depicts the standard error of the mean. S = Study; J = JOL 






















Figure 10. Distributions of JOL ratings for items correctly recalled at the final test in 
Experiment 3.  


















































Figure 11. Distributions of JOL ratings for items incorrectly recalled at the final test 
in Experiment 3.  














































Appendix A: Results of Recall and JOL Magnitude in All Conditions of Experiment 1 
 
Mean percent correct recall and mean JOL magnitude in Experiment 1 as a 
function of JOL timing and type of practice are reported in Table A1, and the results 
from analyses of variance are reported in Table A2. 
 
Table A1 
Mean Percent Correct Recall and Mean JOL Magnitude in Experiment 1 as a 
Function of JOL Timing and Type of Practice 
  Type of practice 
DV JOL timing SJT SSJT SJSJT STSJT SJTSJT 
Recall Immediate 32 (3.27)a 50 (4.22)b 52 (3.54)b 60 (3.93)b 62 (3.92)b
 Delayed 37 (3.71)1 51 (4.18)1 49 (3.70)1,3 64 (3.63)2 62 (3.84)2,3
JOLs Immediate 40 (3.03) 40 (3.13) 41 (2.79) 47 (3.01) 46 (3.90) 
 Delayed 35 (3.48)1 44 (3.92)1,2 48 (3.25)1,3 58 (3.64)3 53 (4.31)2,3
Note. Standard error of the mean is in parentheses; Means of the type of practice that 
do not share alphabetic and numerical superscripts differ in Tukey’s honestly 
significant difference (HSD) comparisons in the immediate- and delayed-JOL 
conditions, respectively, for each of recall and JOL magnitude; S = Study; J = JOL 






Results from Analyses of Variance of Percent Correct Recall and JOL Magnitude in 
Experiment 1 
 Percent correct recall JOL magnitude 
IV F df MSE p ES F df MSE p ES 
Jt 2.14 1,220 92.11 .14  20.49 1,220 126.33 < .001 .08 
P 9.27 4,220 1211.01 < .001 .14 3.28 4,220 961.16 < .05 .06 
Jt×P 2.71 4,220 92.11 < .05 .05 6.59 4,220 126.33 < .001 .11 
Note. Effect size (ES) is reported only when the F value was significant; JOL = 






Appendix B: Results of Recall and JOL Magnitude in SJTSJT of Experiment 1 
 
Mean percent correct recall and mean JOL magnitude for condition SJTSJT in 
Experiment 1 as a function of JOL timing and practice are reported in Table B1, and 
the results from analyses of variance are reported in Table B2. 
 
Table B1 
Mean Percent Correct Recall and Mean JOL Magnitude for condition SJTSJT in 
Experiment 1 as a Function of JOL Timing and Practice 
  Practice 
DV JOL timing Control (first SJT) Practice (second SJT) 
Recall Immediate 27.24 (3.21) 61.53 (3.92) 
 Delayed 30.27 (3.37) 62.47 (3.84) 
JOLs Immediate 40.70 (3.05) 46.20 (3.90) 
 Delayed 28.24 (3.51) 53.41 (4.31) 
Note. Standard error of the mean is in parentheses; S = Study; J = JOL rating; T = 






Results from Analyses of Variance of Percent Correct Recall and JOL Magnitude for 
Condition SJTSJT in Experiment 1 
 Percent correct recall JOL magnitude 
IV F(1, 44) MSE p ES F(1, 44) MSE p ES 
Jt 1.11 158.49 .30  2.24 138.83 .14  
P 275.16 180.75 < .001 .86 38.96 271.54 < .001 .47 
Jt×P < 1    72.90 59.69 < .001 .62 
Note. Effect size (ES) is reported only when the F value was significant; JOL = 





Appendix C: Results of Recall and JOL Magnitude in Experiment 2 
 
Mean percent correct recall and mean JOL magnitude in Experiment 2 as a 
function of type of practice are reported in Table C1, and the results from analyses of 
variance are reported in Table C2. 
 
Table C1 
Mean Percent Correct Recall and Mean JOL Magnitude in Experiment 2 as a 
Function of Type of Practice 
 Type of practice 
DV SJT – delayed JOLs SSJT – immediate JOLs STSJT – immediate JOLs 
Recall 37.57 (2.28) a 46.73 (2.40) b 57.95 (2.60) c
JOLs 32.34 (1.96) 1 36.56 (2.36) 1, 2 42.10 (2.35) 2
Note. Standard error of the mean is in parentheses; Means of the type of practice that 
do not share alphabetic and numerical superscripts differ in Tukey’s HSD 
comparisons for recall and magnitude of JOLs, respectively; S = Study; J = JOL 






Results from Analyses of Variance of Percent Correct Recall and JOL Magnitude in 
Experiment 2 
 Percent correct recall JOL magnitude 
 F(2, 276) MSE p ES F(2, 276) MSE p ES 
P 17.59 551.27 < .001 .11 4.81 463.32 < .01 .03 
Note. Effect size (ES) is reported only when the F value was significant; JOL = 





Appendix D: Results of Recall and JOL Magnitude in Experiment 3 
 
Mean percent correct recall and mean JOL magnitude in Experiment 3 as a 
function of JOL timing and type of practice are reported in Table D1, and the results 
from analyses of variance are reported in Table D2. 
 
Table D1 
Mean Percent Correct Recall and Mean JOL Magnitude in Experiment 3 as a 
Function of JOL timing and Type of Practice 
  Type of practice 
DV JOL timing SSSJT STSJT 
Recall Immediate 68.00 (3.70) 59.40 (3.70) 
 Delayed 69.81 (3.66) 59.66 (3.66) 
JOLs Immediate 49.32 (3.23) 45.32 (3.23) 
 Delayed 56.87 (3.72) 51.24 (3.72) 
Note. Standard error of the mean is in parentheses; S = Study; J = JOL rating; T = 






Results from Analyses of Variance of Percent Correct Recall and JOL Magnitude in 
Experiment 3 
 Percent correct recall JOL magnitude 
IV F(1, 104) MSE p F(1, 104) MSE p ES 
Jt < 1   25.06 95.98 < .001 .19 
P 3.40 1370.17 .07 < 1    
Jt×P < 1   < 1    
Note. Effect size (ES) is reported only when the F value was significant; JOL = 
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